As I noted in the last chapter, the current debate grows out of the confluence of Toynbee's long war cycle and Organski's theory of military challenges to the hierarchical world order. In the current debate, as in the long wave debate (chapter 3), three theoretical groupings, or research schools, have developed (see fig. 6.1). One school is descended from Toynbee and Wright, with the incorporation of Organski's and Farrar's influence. This is the current leadership cycle school, led by Modelski. A second school, led by Wallerstein, is the world-system school, which has engaged the Toynbee/Organski problem of war and hegemony from a Marxist perspective. This school has interacted, but not agreed, with the leadership cycle school. The third school, shown at the right, is the power transition school, growing out of Organski's approach.

Each current research tradition grows out of a more general approach to international relations—peace research, neo-Marxism, and realism, respectively. And these three approaches in turn correspond roughly with the three world views (liberal, revolutionary, and conservative) discussed in chapter 1. In general, the peace research approach is oriented toward the quantitative and qualitative study of war to understand its causes and bring about its reduction. The neo-Marxist approach emphasizes the importance of the world-system structured by the inequality (and unequal dependency) between core and periphery and seeks to change the underlying socioeconomic context that leads to war. The realist approach focuses on national power and balance-of-power politics and seeks "timeless" laws of national behavior.

These differences in approach are reflected in different foci for the three current schools in the war/hegemony debate. The leadership cycle school focuses on the role of global war in establishing a new international order under a world leader roughly every century. The neo-Marxist world-system school focuses on hegemony and rivalry in the core of the world economy, linking hegemonic cycles to pairs of long waves. The power transition school focuses on changes in national power and their effects on war and hegemony.

Hegemony

The hegemony cycle is based on the idea that one country rises, during hegemonic war, to a preeminent position in a hierarchical international
Figure 6.1. The Current War/Hegemony Debate

Marxist Approaches

("neo-Marxist")

(50-year cycles)

Wallerstein
Hopkins
Chase-Dunn
Bousquet
Bergesen

Peace Research Approaches

Wright

Singer (COW)

Toynbee

Farrar

Modelsiki

Thompson
Rasler,
Zuk, etc.

Realist Approaches

Dehio

Organski

(Organski &
Kugler)

Doran & Parsons

Gilpin

Väyrynen

"World-System School"

"Leadership Cycle School"

"Power Transition School"
order, a position from which it eventually falls and to which another country succeeds. This preeminent position is called *hegemony*.

*Hegemony* has different meanings: some scholars refer mainly to military and political predominance, while others refer to economic predominance. I use the term in a broad sense including both. Also, some scholars (for example, Doran 1971) use hegemony to refer to the failed attempts at military supremacy within the great power system (for example, Napoleonic France), while others use it to refer to the leading country emerging victorious after such a challenge is suppressed (for example, post-Napoleonic Britain). The latter usage is more common, and I will follow it.\(^1\)

In referring to a preeminent nation as “hegemonic” I do not mean to imply a necessarily oppressive or inequitable arrangement (as the flavor of the term sometimes implies) but only the “dictionary” sense: “leadership; preponderant ascendency or authority, as among states.”\(^2\) Modelski prefers the term *world leadership*, with its cooperative rather than exploitive overtones, while Organski refers to “one country at the apex of the pyramid” of world politics.

Hegemony seems to have acquired two connotations, positive and negative. In the positive image, “benign hegemony,” the leading country takes on the burden of maintaining international order and pays a disproportionate price for doing so. In this approach, international order is seen as a “public good” benefiting all countries, supported by the hegemonic power. Kindleberger (1973:28) argues that “the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country which is prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under some system of rules that it has internalized, to set standards of conduct for other countries; and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system.” Britain had this role from 1815 to 1913, and the United States after 1945, according to Kindleberger, but in the interwar years Britain was unable, and the United States was unwilling, to accept this leadership role; Kindleberger sees in this lack of leadership the main causes for the severity of the depression of the 1930s. “Hegemonic stability theory” (see Keohane 1980), to quote McKeown’s (1983:73) summary, argues that “it is the power of hegemonic states that leads to the emergence of open international economic systems” with free trade, benefiting all.\(^3\)

In the negative image of hegemony, the preeminence of one country is seen as an exploitative dominance of the world system gained by one country over other competitors. Kurth (1971:20) uses the term *hegemony* to refer to great power domination of small states.\(^4\) Kurth notes that since World War II, “while the practice

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1. This usage includes the shared understanding that the period after World War II was one of American hegemony.
2. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, S. V. “hegemony.”
3. McKeown (1983:89–90) himself is doubtful about this, however. While such a theory has “obvious attractions,” consensus on it is “at best premature. The theory has been plagued by numerous conceptual ambiguities and omissions . . . Its predictive accuracy is poor.” McKeown suggests instead (for the 19th and 20th c.) that open trading systems occur at times of general world prosperity and that closure of the system occurs at times of general depression.
4. A great power controlling a network of these states in a region has a “hegemonial system.” Kurth lists ten such systems since 1648.
of hegemony increased, especially by Americans, the mention of hegemony declined, especially by Americans." In current usage by the world-system school (see below), hegemony implies that one core country dominates exploitive core-periphery relations.

These are some of the different implications the term hegemony can evoke. Different views of hegemony will be elaborated under each school.

The Leadership Cycle School

George Modelski (1978), like Farrar (1977), builds on Toynbee’s roughly one-hundred-year cycle of general war. Modelski argues (1978) that a “global political system . . . defined as the institutions and arrangements for the management of global problems or relations” has existed since about the year 1500. In contrast to Wallerstein’s (1974) contention that the world system arose from capitalism, Modelski’s (1981:63) approach is “distinguished by the emphasis it lays on the autonomy of global political [versus economic] processes.”

Modelski (1978) defines “world powers” as those units that monopolize the function of order-keeping in the global system. Since 1500 this role has been played by four states in turn: Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. Each power remained dominant for about a century (except Britain, which repeated for another century), and each of these centuries constitutes one “world leadership cycle.”

Each cycle begins with a period of weak organization that gives way to “global war” (roughly corresponding in dating to Toynbee’s periods of general war). One world power emerges from the global war as the dominant power and maintains order in the world system. However, “the time comes when the energy that built this order begins to run down” (p. 217) and competitors come forward. The system becomes multipolar, order gradually dissolves, and the cycle returns to its starting point with the coming of the next global war.

Modelski dates the five “global war” periods and the world powers that arose from them as follows:

1494–1517 Portugal
1579–1609 Netherlands
1688–1713 Britain (1)
1792–1815 Britain (2)
1914–1945 United States

Modelski’s account of the five cycles since 1500 parallels Dehio’s history but emphasizes the winners rather than the losers. Whereas Dehio stresses the role of the

5. He credits Charles de Gaulle with keeping the term hegemony alive after World War II, in referring to the “two hegemonies” (the Soviet Union and United States in Eastern and Western Europe).
6. Modelski thus argues that “a succession of world powers shaped the global system” (1978:216). The world leadership cycle has “produced . . . the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant organization in world politics” (1978:230–31). Nation-states defined the identity of successive global systems, and global power in its turn strengthened those states that attained it.
unsuccessful aspirants to world hegemony (Spain, France, Germany), Modelski emphasizes the successful powers that built world orders based on control of shipping and trade (Portugal, Netherlands, 7 Britain, United States). The two schemes can thus be combined as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hegemonic Powers:</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failed Aspirants:</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(USSR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modelski (1984b:19) argues that a coalition formed in each global war to contain the challenger. In the century after each global war (except after 1710), the winning coalition fractured and one of its members became the new challenger (p. 23).

In his historical interpretation of the past five centuries, Modelski (1978:218) writes that around 1500 “the global system was a dispersed one” lacking “provision for self-maintenance and defense against interlopers” despite the system of long-distance trade linking Europe with Asia (controlled at the western end by Venice). Venice, which monopolized trade with Alexandria, was the Mediterranean’s “leading power and has since served as the model for later world powers.”

“The kings of Portugal determined to break into that system,” according to Modelski (p. 218). In 1498 Vasco da Gama reached India by sea, and, “in the series of swift naval campaigns that followed, a string of bases was established and rival fleets were wiped off the oceans.” A series of major wars in Italy drastically curtailed the power of Venice, and by 1515 “a new order had been established. . . . Portugal rose to global status in circumstances of severe conflict of global dimensions.” Portugal monopolized the Asian trade and explored Africa and Brazil.8

By the second half of the sixteenth century, “Portugal . . . was feeling the strain of maintaining this far-flung system on a rather slender home base” (p. 219). Pressure from Spain mounted, and when Spain in 1580 seized Portugal, “the Portuguese global system was merged with the domains of the Spanish Hapsburgs. For a short time (but in truth only for a fleeting moment) the union seemed to be raising an intercontinental structure of towering proportions, but the defeat of the Great Armada (1588) soon punctured this illusion” (p. 219).

With the fall of Portugal and the failure of Spain’s drive for dominance, Spain’s rebellious subjects in the Netherlands came out on top:

These wealthy provinces derived much of their income from trade with Lisbon, and Antwerp had until a short time before served as the banking and distribution center of the Portuguese system. But when the King of Spain, some years after his success in Portugal, banned all rebel

7. Dehio does not see Portugal or the Netherlands as what Modelski would call a world power but instead stresses the superiority of England from as early as 1588.

8. While Wallerstein (1974) sees Spain as dominant in the 16th c. (see below), Modelski argues that “it was Portugal that first seized the heart of the preexisting world system and thus drastically altered its structure” (p. 219). Although “there is something to be said for describing the system as bipolar,” since the two powers divided the periphery in the Treaty of Tordesillas, nonetheless “Spain operated on the fringes and never developed a truly global outlook.”
trade, the Dutch took matters into their own hands, sailed to the East and proceeded to capture the spice trade from the Portuguese (p. 220).

By 1609, when the United Provinces signed a truce with Spain, "the essentials of the Dutch global system were in place." Drawing support from England and France (who opposed Spain), the Dutch "maintained a pattern of global activity as intricate and possibly even more daring than that of their predecessors." The Dutch navy established its clear superiority over the Spanish, and by around 1660 three-quarters of the seagoing merchant ships of Europe sailed under the Dutch flag. "Control of the Baltic trade and a near monopoly of the carrying trade in Europe was combined with influence in Venice, a firm hold over the spice trade of the Indies and substantial interests in Africa and the Americas" (p. 220).

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, however, the Dutch encountered French pressure and had to ally with England to hold back France. The great wars against Louis XIV continued until his defeat in 1713.

The Dutch had held their own against the French, but the price was the effective transfer of global power to what had just become Great Britain. As the English navy took over the chief burden of fighting the French on the high seas and the Dutch concentrated on the land campaigns, the Dutch navy lost the impetus of its expansion and began to suffer neglect (p. 221).

The British global system was born in the struggle against the French and was, like the Dutch system before it, "firmly anchored in the control of world trade" (p. 221). Amsterdam, tied in with the British system, retained its position as the center of investment finance but fell behind in maritime strength and trade. Portugal granted important privileges to English merchants in 1703, and the Lisbon-London trade siphoned off gold and diamonds from overseas Portuguese possessions. Even Spanish Latin America was opened slightly to English trade. "Thus without assuming direct control over the colonial territories of earlier world powers England put in place the superstructure whereby the cream might be skimmed off the top and the whole fitted into a global economic pattern" (p. 222). By 1763 England had gained strength in Asia and the Americas (against France), the English East India Company "had become a great Asian power," and England was playing the role of "power balancer" on the European continent, preventing the rise of any power that aspired to continental supremacy.

After the American War of Independence, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic wars, "another generation of global warfare was required before a global order was reestablished and reaffirmed by the settlements of 1814–15" (p. 222). The resulting second cycle of British dominance, according to Modelski, "repeated some of the essential properties of the first: the European balance . . . ; the command of the sea, and a controlling position in extra-European and world trade." But novel elements also appeared—"the development of London into the center of world banking and shipping; newly emerging industrial and technological superiority" (p. 223).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the world order again "began to lose
vigor” (p. 223). European and American challengers broke Britain’s industrial monopoly; railways cut into the importance of Britain’s dominance in shipping. In the world depression that followed the year 1873, “commercial competition grew fierce and put British traders on the defensive for the first time in two centuries. Britain’s industrial mainstays, coal and cotton, ceased to be world growth leaders.” By 1900 “it had become clear to many that Pax Britannica was well past its prime and that the world system was swiftly losing its ordering capacities” (p. 223).

The ensuing global war period, in Modelski’s framework, includes both world wars. The transition to U.S. leadership was not smooth. The outcome of World War I seemed to assure the United States of a leading role in the . . . laying of the foundations of the new international order. But President Wilson was repudiated at home, and the United States neither took up the position that was its own for the taking nor proffered an alternative scheme for world order. The resulting vacuum of authority attracted another challenge and another cataclysmic clash (p. 223).

Modelski treats World Wars I and II “as one generation-long period of global conflict forming the world order that emerged in 1945” (pp. 223–24). The final step in the succession of power “occurred in 1947 when in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan American leaders declared their willingness to step into Britain’s place” (p. 224).

This sketch summarizes Modelski’s (1978) historical description of the leadership cycle. He then discusses (1981) the theoretical underpinnings of that cycle. Modelski’s theory connects the leadership cycle with pairs of long waves and stresses innovation as the driving force. He argues that economic and political innovations alternate on successive phases of the long wave. Modelski distinguishes four phases of the world leadership cycle (p. 73):9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long wave upswing 1:</th>
<th>Global war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long wave downswing 1:</td>
<td>World power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long wave upswing 2:</td>
<td>Delegitimization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long wave downswing 2:</td>
<td>Deconcentration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dominant world power has also historically been the leading economy of the world, Modelski argues, and has shaped the international economic order.10 In addition, Modelski sees an evolution, in successive cycles, of political structure11 and military techniques—which he calls “waves of political innovations” (p. 66). Each world power played the key role in both economic and political innovation (p. 68).12

9. Only two phases were distinguished in 1978 (p. 232).
10. The role of leading economy requires the political stability that only a world power can provide. And the high cost of operating as a world power cannot be maintained without a strong and growing economy (Modelski 1981:70).
11. Residential diplomacy from 1500 onward; international law consolidated after 1600; balance of power theory and practice around 1700; the Concert of Europe after 1815; and the emergence of international organizations in the 20th c.
12. Including the growth of new leading sectors of the world economy and new techniques of global communications.
Modelski argues that there is a trade-off between political development and economic growth in that both consume limited social resources (pp. 75–76). Periods of high political innovation, in Modelski’s view, alternate with periods of economic innovation. The political innovation periods match the expansion phases of the long wave, while the economic innovation periods match the stagnation phases (p. 77). Modelski’s empirical evidence for this idea is weakened by its reliance on a self-selected list of political innovations (p. 78), and his periodization of long waves is out of phase with that of Kondratieff and most other scholars after 1890:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kondratieff/Mandel:</th>
<th>Modelski:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870/75–1890/96 down</td>
<td>1874–1913 down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890/96–1914/20 up</td>
<td>1913–1946 up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914/20–1940/48 down</td>
<td>1946–1973 down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/48–1968 up</td>
<td>1973–? up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968–? down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modelski considers 1913–46 a single “up” period of global war in which the depression of the 1930s was an interlude. The 1946–73 period was a “down” phase with relatively low price inflation, while the period since 1973 is an “up” phase with high inflation.

The major problem with Modelski’s “alternating innovations” model is that it does not explain the pairing of long waves to make up a longer “leadership cycle.” Modelski (1981:79) says only that “the global wars form the major pulse of the world system, while the in-between ‘up’ periods serve the function of mid-course correction.” But why two long waves per leadership cycle rather than three or one? And how does the innovation dynamic lead to the one-hundred-year period necessary for the erosion and restructuring of global order?

Modelski does not answer these questions, and by 1984 he changes direction, moving away from long waves. The alternating innovations model (1982:108) rests on an assumption of a “single logic for the politico-economic process” at the world system level—an assumption that “these two structures of the world system [are] related.” However, in 1984 Modelski (1984a:5) argues that, although the leadership cycle may be linked or partially synchronous with the long wave, they should not be described as one cycle; the cycle periods and patterns of recurrence differ. “[W]e need . . . to keep distinct the two processes, one political and the other economic.”

Modelski’s view of the future considers two processes: the decline of U.S. leadership, and the possible transformation of the global war process into a more

13. Modelski states that the idea of alternating innovations is “simpler, thus more plausible” than a model of simultaneous political and economic growth and innovation (p. 75). This is not elaborated, however.
14. Kondratieff until 1914/20, then Mandel.
peaceful transition process. On the first point, Modelski (1981:80–81) argues that the period since 1973 "cannot be defined as that of a loss of position as leading economy for the United States or . . . a decline of American economic power . . . . The United States remains the single most important economic unit in the world." Modelski's timing of phases puts declining U.S. power ("deconcentration") still decades in the future. The most important condition for the United States to retain its role is the successful management of political and economic innovation (p. 80).16

As for the future, Modelski (1979:16) argues that those who take the leadership cycle with its component of global war seriously will be "impelled to devise drastic measures of political innovation for the modern world system."17 He (1984b:3) stresses that the long leadership cycle is not a "war cycle" but a "political cycle." Even though world political leadership has been decided by global war in the past, other leadership selection processes—parallel to the role of elections in domestic politics—could be used in the future.

Modelski's approach reflects a liberal world view in its emphasis on innovation and on the role of the individual nation-state in the evolution of the nation-state system. Modelski's political innovations reflect Schumpeter's economic innovations on the level of world politics. Modelski (1982:98) prefers the term world leadership to hegemony.18 Leadership is "the ability to innovate and move ahead in the common interest" (p. 104). Modelski and Thompson (1981:2) "conceive the global political system . . . as cooperative action . . . for the attainment of common interests, or the production of public goods." These are liberal conceptions of international order.

By the mid-1980s, Modelski's approach had spawned what I call the leadership cycle school.19 Modelski (1983) provides a bibliography of works in this school by twenty authors, including Modelski himself, William Thompson, and Thompson's coauthors Karen Rasler and L. Gary Zuk. The leadership cycle school has gained attention in the political science discipline20 but seems to be supported by only a minority.

William Thompson and his coauthors have conducted a series of empirical tests on particular aspects of the world leadership cycle theory. Some of these will be

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16. The present phase is a "crisis of world order . . . of legitimacy . . . a political and moral crisis." The United States retains the chief responsibility for solving such global problems as the international monetary order and the problems of world oil. "The absence of resolute leadership and failure to deal with these problems . . . has produced a period of disarray that gravely contributes to further undermining the legitimacy of the international economic order" (p. 81).

17. "This is the period in which strategic emphasis needs to be placed on political innovation" (Modelski 1981:81).

18. "When a leading state acts in the public interest and its actions are thought legitimate, then its behavior cannot be described as hegemonial" (p. 98).

19. Its members generally refer to this cycle simply as "the long cycle," a term that Modelski himself (1984a) admits should be reserved for a general class of which the leadership cycle and the long wave are two members.

20. For instance, Modelski's panel on Alternatives to the Next Global War at the 1984 American Political Science Association conference attracted an audience of over 100.
discussed in chapter 12, below, but the following summary indicates the type of work going on in this research school.

Thompson (1984:12a) analyzes data on naval capabilities as measured by capital warships in the five centuries since 1495. Thompson lists the years in which one nation holds more than 50 percent of the indexed world naval capabilities as follows:

- 1502–44
- 1608–19, 1624, 1632–33, 1635–36, 1640–42
- 1719–23 [mean concentration of .472 for 1714–50]
- 1809–12, 1814–34, 1843, 1854–57, 1861, 1880–81, 1889–90
- 1944–

The years in which the future leader passed the declining leader’s naval power score are listed as:

- Netherlands 1602
- England 1676
- United States 1941

Thompson calculates average naval power concentration scores (percentage of world capabilities held by leader) by long wave phase periods (not quite synchronous with those I have been using, however) and finds that the changes in naval concentration do not correlate with the long wave (p. 14a).

Rasler and Thompson (1983) study the impact of global wars on long-term public debt, especially for the leading power. They argue that war has strongly affected national debts, which in return have affected the ability to wage war:

[The] winners in the struggle for world leadership owed a significant proportion of their success to the ability to obtain credit inexpensively, to sustain relatively large debts, and in general to leverage the initially limited base of their wealth in order to meet their staggering military expenses. . . . [But] winning leads to successively higher levels of permanent debt burdens (p. 490).

Thus, through access to credit, the winners defeat nations with larger populations and economic capabilities, but at the price of a permanent high debt burden that eventually undermines their position. Rasler and Thompson illustrate this dynamic with narrative and data for each world power in the ‘leadership cycle.’ The lingering debts resulting from war contribute to the ‘high overhead costs of the world-power role’ (p. 515)—costs that erode the position won through military victory.

Several other works in this school may be mentioned. Thompson and Zuk (1982) examine the correlation of major wars with economic long wave phases and the effects of major wars on prices in Britain and the United States. Rasler and Thompson

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21. The definition actually changes several times, measuring different naval assets in different time periods.

22. For example, "both Spain and France [losers] experienced critical difficulties in obtaining further credit when it was most needed during periods of global warfare" (p. 497). Spain declared bankruptcy six times between 1557 and 1647. The Dutch and British, by contrast, "were able to develop and exploit their innovational and institutionalized access to short- and long-term credit" (p. 499).
son (1985b) examine the effects of war on economic growth. Modelski and Thompson (1981) test a "cobweb" model (borrowed from econometric modeling of market fluctuations) based on the world leadership cycle. Strickland (1982) attempts to integrate leadership-cycle theory with "lateral pressure" theory. Raymond and Kegley (1985) investigate the connection of internationalized civil wars with phases of the leadership cycle. Several of these studies will be discussed further in chapter 12, below.

Recently Thompson appears to have moved, along with Modelski, away from the idea of a close linkage of the leadership cycle with long waves. He argues (1984) that the two kinds of cycle show "fundamental traces of dissynchronization" and concludes that the leadership cycle and long wave should be treated as "separate, albeit interdependent, processes." Thus, although the leadership cycle originated through Wright and Toynbee as a concept rooted in the long wave, it has now taken on a separate existence in the theoretical debate.

The World-System School

A second major school to emerge in the current debate is rooted in a neo-Marxist framework. I call this school the world-system school (see fig. 6.1).

Neo-Marxist approaches differ from more traditional Marxism in emphasizing core-periphery relations in the world system rather than just the most advanced (core) capitalist countries. Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1979:295) write:

In Marxist terminology the institutional constants of the modern world system are capitalist commodity production with expanded reproduction in the core, and primitive accumulation in the periphery in the context of the core-periphery division of labor and the state system. This is a departure from Marx's own understanding of the fully developed capitalist mode of production which, focusing on the core of the system, defined capitalism as synonymous with the wage system of labor exploitation.

Bergesen (1980) refers to "class struggle on a world scale":

The core-periphery division of labor and the process of unequal exchange are direct consequences of the class struggle between core and periphery . . . Since the sixteenth century the vast majority of the world's territory has been brought under colonial control. What we now call the periphery represents social formations and local modes of production that were either destroyed or significantly modified such that their productive activity came to be directed toward generating surplus value that was transferred . . . to the core (p. 124).

The world-system school approaches the war/hegemony question in the context of the capitalist world-economy and at first connected it with economic long waves. This school in fact forms the main link between the long wave debate and the hegemony cycle debate. Later (as with the leadership cycle school), the two kinds of cycles were separated.

23. The journal Review, edited by Wallerstein, has printed a number of long wave articles. Wallerstein also puts out an occasional Newsletter on Long Waves internationally. Wallerstein himself (1984a) has also written about long waves, discussing whether long waves existed before industrial times and arguing that too few long wave studies use profit rate as the key variable.
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979) and their “research working group on cyclical rhythms and secular trends” argue that “the growth of the capitalist world-economy exhibits a ‘cyclical’ character and [that] this cyclical pattern is constitutive of the world-economy.” The capitalist world-economy contains “such contradictions that its growth cannot be unremittingly linear and still be capitalist” (p. 485). This approach is consistent with other Marxist theories of the long wave. However, Hopkins and Wallerstein criticize explanations that focus too much on “an abstract model of the accumulation process” without including “the social structures through which capitalism operates,” which “permit a wide variety of modes of accumulation” (p. 493). Also, theories focusing solely on the European component of capitalism rather than the world-system as a whole are seen as limiting. Hopkins and Wallerstein “therefore presume the interrelationship of ‘politico-cultural’ and ‘economic’ processes, and will always specifically take account of the axial division of labor in the world-economy between core and periphery” (p. 493).

This connection of economics and politics is embodied, for Hopkins and Wallerstein, in a long political-economic cycle made up of paired long waves (parallel to the pairing suggested by Toynbee, Modelski, and others). The long wave is seen as arising from the self-limitations of capital reproduction (“stagnation theoretically must follow expansion” [p. 493]). These limits derive from the lack of coordination of production decisions.\(^{25}\)

Hopkins and Wallerstein suggest that long waves come in pairs that affect the core and periphery differently (p. 495). They name the successive phase A1–B1–A2–B2, where A1 and A2 are upswings and B1 and B2 are downswings. The core is a high-wage zone and the periphery a low-wage zone. During the A1 upswing, production of low-wage goods expands faster than high-wage goods as the economy expands into new regions, and terms of trade favor low-wage goods and raw materials. Terms of trade then even out as the supply of low-wage goods exceeds demand, and eventually the expansion turns to stagnation. This brings class struggle and a consequent redistribution of income, which increases demand and leads to a new expansion.\(^{26}\) This time the expansion favors high-wage goods because of the higher income elasticity of the demand for high-wage goods. But this expansion also peters out, and there is a “crash” leading back to the beginning of the cycle (p. 496). During the downswings, world specialization reduces (that is, production of high-wage goods shifts toward the periphery and low-wage goods toward the core), and during upswings specialization increases.

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24. A major consequence of this cyclical character of growth is that “spatial shift in the locus of the zones of the world-economy [core, semiperiphery, periphery] is continuous and inevitable” (p. 485). These geographical shifts do not change the system’s basic structure, however; “they are primarily a game of ‘musical chairs’ in which the relative roles of core and periphery remain the same” (p. 485).

25. See “rationality” discussion in chap. 7.

26. Note that the hypothesis of increased class struggle during the stagnation phase opposes that of Mandel and Cronin (chap. 3). For Mandel, class struggle reduces profits, contributing to the end of an upswing; for Hopkins and Wallerstein, class struggle increases demand (by redistributing income), contributing to the beginning of an upswing.
This is the economic side of Hopkins and Wallerstein’s theory. The political side addresses “hegemony”: 27

Interstate relations center around the relation among core powers, and their ability to control peripheral areas. If we assume a number of core states, we can assume ‘rivalry’ as a normal state of affairs, with exceptional periods in which one core power exceeds all others in the efficiency of its productive, commercial and financial activities, and in military strength. We can call this latter ‘hegemony’.

If hegemonic powers always ‘decline’, because the technological edge of efficiency is inherently subject to disappearance through emulation, while the wage-levels of technologically-advanced production are subject to endemic real rise (in order to maintain, via politico-economic concession, a high rate of production), then there are always potential successors among the rivals.

There would then be periods, in terms of the world-economy, of ascending hegemony, hegemony, and declining hegemony (p. 497).

Hopkins and Wallerstein relate these periods of hegemonic succession to the paired long waves just discussed:

A1 (up): Ascending Hegemony—acute conflict between rivals to succession
B1 (down): Hegemonic Victory—‘new’ power bypasses ‘old’ declining power
A2 (up): Hegemonic Maturity—true hegemony
B2 (down): Declining Hegemony—acute conflict of hegemonic power versus successors

Figure 6.2 illustrates these relationships along with dates for the last four cycles (the hegemonic cycles of the Hapsburgs, Netherlands, Britain, and the United States). 28

Hopkins and Wallerstein’s dating of the A1 phases, that is, ascending hegemony, corresponds roughly to Toynbee’s periods of ‘general war.’ The A2 phases (hegemonic maturity) correspond with Toynbee’s ‘supplementary wars’—except in the most recent cycle. 29 Hopkins and Wallerstein theorize that A2 periods are ‘moments of ‘free trade’ because the hegemonic power imposes a general ‘openness’ on the

28. As noted earlier, Wallerstein, in contrast to Modelski, considers Hapsburg Spain (not Portugal) the first hegemon.
29. Toynbee considered World War I a general war, the 1920s and 1930s as the breathing space, and World War II as an anomalous supplementary war, with the general peace from 1945 on. Hopkins and Wallerstein, like Modelski, put both world wars into one phase. They consider it a downswing, however, while Modelski considered it an upswing, putting them out of phase after 1914:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hopkins and Wallerstein</th>
<th>Modelski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D (Hegemonic victory) 1913/20–1945</td>
<td>U 1913–1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U (Hegemonic maturity) 1945–1967</td>
<td>D 1946–1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D (Declining hegemony) 1967–</td>
<td>U 1973–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In previous cycles, hegemonic victory corresponded with Toynbee’s ‘breathing space’ and maturity with Toynbee’s ‘supplementary wars.’
system. It can be said that the system is enjoying at such moments the temporary effects of the Ricardian model’’ (p. 498). B2 periods, by contrast, ‘‘would be moments of colonization, as rival core powers move to ‘pre-empt’ potential peripheral zones’’ (p. 498).

This scheme thus encompasses various economic and political dynamics within one framework. However, it fails to show why these processes should follow so regular and mechanistic a rhythm. In this sense it resembles Modelski’s (1981, 1982) attempt to tie hegemony cycles to long waves (see above). And as in that case, recent emphasis (see below) has shifted toward describing a war/hegemony dynamic less tightly connected with long waves.

Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1979) study both long waves defined in terms of ‘‘the relative rate of capital accumulation and overall economic activity’’ and cycles of ‘‘core competition’’ marked by unicentricity or multicentricity among core states (p. 279). Chase-Dunn and Rubinson state (p. 295) that ‘‘we do not yet understand the
causal structure which produces these cycles,’” and they do not link long waves and hegemonic cycles as Hopkins and Wallerstein do. Instead they define three historical cases of hegemony in the world-system: the United Provinces (Netherlands), the United Kingdom, and the United States (p. 279).30 Wallerstein (1983) later also adopts this framework (a switch from Hopkins and Wallerstein 1979). This dating of hegemony cycles not built from paired long waves contrasts with that of the leadership cycle school.31

Wallerstein (1983) defines hegemony in these three instances as ‘‘that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called ‘great powers’ is so unbalanced that . . . one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas’’ (p. 101).32 Wallerstein refers to hegemony as ‘‘one end of a fluid continuum’’ of competitive relations between core powers in which both ends—hegemony and multipolar equality—are rare and unstable (p. 102). Wallerstein (p. 102) lists the three periods of hegemony as maximally defined by roughly these dates:

United Provinces 1625–72
United Kingdom 1815–73
United States 1945–67

Each hegemon achieved its preeminent position based on its ability to operate more efficiently in three economic areas—agroindustrial production, commerce, and finance (p. 103). The hegemon’s edge in efficiency is so great that enterprises based in the hegemonic power can outbid those based elsewhere in the world, even within the latter’s home countries. Wallerstein argues that each hegemonic power first gains and then loses its edge in production, commerce, and finance, in that order. Hegemony exists during the short period in which all three overlap.

Wallerstein points to broad similarities between each hegemonic power. Each advocated global liberalism, including free trade (antimercantilism), anticolonialism, parliamentary institutions, civil liberties, and a relatively high standard of living for their own national working classes. Each was primarily a sea (then sea and air) power.

In the long ascent to hegemony, they seemed very reluctant to develop their armies, discussing openly the potentially weakening drain on state revenues and manpower of becoming tied down in land wars. Yet each found finally that it had to develop a strong land army as well to face up to a major land-based rival which seemed to be trying to transform the world-economy into a world-empire (p. 103).

30. Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1979:287) argue that ‘‘the Pax Americana was quite short. The fall of the Bretton Woods agreement signaled the end of the use of the US dollar as the world currency.’’
31. It contains three cycles in the space of Modelski’s four (he has two British cycles). Also, while Modelski calls Portugal the first hegemonic power (preceding the Netherlands), Chase-Dunn and Wallerstein suggest a less hegemonic situation dominated not by Portugal but by Spain.
32. Hegemony is distinguished from empire, since ‘‘omnipotence does not exist within the interstate system’’ (p. 102).
Each instance of hegemony, Wallerstein notes, "was secured by a thirty-year-long world war." His definition of world war is "a land-based war that involves (not necessarily continuously) almost all the major military powers of the epoch in warfare that is very destructive of land and population" (p. 103).\(^{33}\) The world wars corresponding with each instance of hegemony were in 1618–48 (triumph of Dutch over Hapsburgs), 1792–1815 (triumph of British over French), and 1914–45 (triumph of America over Germany). World wars, in contrast to other more limited wars, have (like hegemony itself) been "a rarity" in the world-system, according to Wallerstein.

In the aftermath of each world war, according to Wallerstein, came a major restructuring of the interstate system (Westphalia; the Concert of Europe; the U.N. and Bretton Woods) in a form consonant with the need for relative stability of the now hegemonic power. Furthermore, once the hegemonic position was eroded economically . . . and therefore hegemonic decline set in, one consequence seemed to be the erosion of the alliance network which the hegemonic power had created . . . .

In the long period following the era of hegemony, two powers seemed eventually to emerge as the "contenders for the succession"—England and France after Dutch hegemony; the U.S. and Germany after British; and now Japan and western Europe after U.S. Furthermore, the eventual winner [turned] the old hegemonic power into its "junior partner" (p. 104).\(^{34}\)

All of this parallels Modelski's leadership cycle, except that the dating of world wars and their hegemonic winners differs:\(^{35}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wallerstein</th>
<th>Modelski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1618–1648 Netherlands</td>
<td>1494–1517 Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688–1713 Britain (1)</td>
<td>1579–1609 Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914–1945 United States</td>
<td>1688–1713 Britain (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1792–1815 Britain</td>
<td>1792–1815 Britain (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914–1945 United States</td>
<td>1914–1945 United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This difference in dating hinges on the question of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), which falls in the middle (that is, not the global war period) of the world leadership cycle (and of Hopkins and Wallerstein's earlier paired long wave scheme). If the Thirty Years' War is considered a hegemonic war (cf. Midlarsky 1984a) the timing of the hegemony cycle follows Wallerstein (stressing land warfare). Otherwise the timing follows Modelski (stressing naval warfare).

These two major approaches to dating hegemony cycles correspond with two datings already mentioned in chapter 5. Toynbee's dating of war cycles based on pairs of long waves corresponds with Modelski's dating of global wars. Quincy

\(^{33}\) Note the difference from the leadership cycle school's emphasis on naval war.

\(^{34}\) Note the difference from Toynbee, Dehio, and Modelski, who suggest the Soviet Union as the probable next challenger.

\(^{35}\) Wallerstein (1983, 1984a) places world wars near the peak of each "logistic" cycle (see chaps. 3 and 13), whose troughs are in 1450, 1730, and 1897.
Wright's division of military history into successive eras corresponds with Wallerstein's dating of world wars and implies a somewhat longer hegemony cycle less closely linked to the long wave.

Bousquet (1979:516), another member of Wallerstein's Research Working Group, paralleled Chase-Dunn (and preceded Wallerstein) in deemphasizing the link of hegemony to long waves. She finds the "argument of the Research Group that there exists a 'hegemonic cycle' linked to two pairs of Kondratieffs . . . open to empirical skepticism. . . . Political cycles are in fact longer than two pairs of Kondratieffs." Bousquet suggests a revision that incorporates a longer and more variable ascending phase and (like Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn) condenses the five cycles of the paired long wave scheme into four (p. 509).36

Bousquet's (1980:49) theoretical explanation of these long cycles of hegemony centers on the role of innovation in promoting productive superiority in one core country. Hegemony for Bousquet is defined as "supremacy in the realms of production, commerce, and finance, and . . . a position of political leadership."37 This supremacy is based on the creation of a new leading sector concentrated in one country. "It is precisely the uneven distribution of innovation at the core that causes temporary gaps between different countries" (p. 52). National economies, Bousquet argues, are "different environments within which the process of diversification of products and processes unfolds" (p. 53). The differences from one national economy to another38 affect the production techniques favored in each country, and the hegemonic nation achieves superiority by "finding radically new methods of production in one or more sectors" (p. 53).39

Bousquet lists these nationally based historical leading sectors as follows:

- Holland: Shipbuilding and sea transport, providing a more general model of low profit-margin operations.
- England: Textiles (spinning devices) and mining (steam engine), spilling over into widespread mechanization.
- America: Electronics and computers, revolutionizing the management of enterprises across the board.

She writes:

Thanks to these major innovations, the entity wherein they occur finds itself in a position of production supremacy within the world-economy, and eventually obtains other dimensions

36. According to her scheme, the U.S. period of hegemonic maturity covers from 1960 through the present, and "declining hegemony" has not yet begun.
37. Economic hegemony means that "the products of one core power predominate in the world-market over those of other nonhegemonic powers; . . . its merchants or equivalent economic institutions carve for themselves a large part of the world network of exchange; . . . it controls and owns the largest part in relative terms of the world production apparatus. Thanks to the lion's share in world trade and investments, the currency of the predominant power becomes the universal medium of exchange and its metropolis becomes the financial center of the world" (p. 49).
38. These include scarcity or abundance of labor and of capital and the structure of demand.
39. Weber (1983:44) shares with Bousquet "the view that each crisis is resolved through a structural reorganization of political economy" but rejects her views on the role of innovation in hegemony.
characteristic of authentic hegemony, namely, commercial and financial supremacy, and political leadership coupled with military supremacy (p. 79). Bousquet (1980:68) argues that hegemonic decline is rooted in overspecialization by the hegemonic power, which reduces innovation while competing powers “catch up.”

It is as though the hegemony carries the seeds of its own destruction. In our view the very success of the hegemonic power’s advanced sectors within the world-economy contributes, at some half-way stage in its hegemonic life, to shifting the innovation process away from major changes in the methods of production, and toward merely repeating and improving what had been so successful . . . . So, the growth of key advanced sectors is simultaneous with a technological lull in terms of major innovations. As we know, technological lulls are dangerous: they allow others to buy time (p. 68).

“Catching up,” Bousquet argues, “is a complex process” that involves emulation of innovations and is linked with protectionism (p. 68). “Protectionism does not happen at any given phase of some kind of national development process” (p. 77) but at certain conjunctures in the world system. Bergesen (1980) focuses on relations between the core and periphery. He sees two waves of colonization:

1500–1815 First wave of colonial expansion
1820–1870 First trough of colonialism
1870–1945 Second colonial expansion
1945–1973 Second trough

Bergesen ties these movements to hegemony: “Colonialism expands when there is instability within the core and contracts when there is stability” (p. 119). He argues (1980:121; 1983:74) that hegemony correlates with colonial contraction and with “free trade,” while lack of hegemony correlates with colonial expansion and mercantilism.

40. I might add that the country creating a major cluster of innovations often finds immediate military applications and propels itself to hegemonic status by that mechanism as well.
41. Raymond Vernon’s product cycle theory (see also Kurth 1979) could help explain Bousquet’s “emulation process.” In the product cycle, an innovative product is first produced in one core country, where it saturates the domestic market, then is exported to foreign markets. Eventually direct foreign investment replaces exports, and foreign production takes off. Finally home production levels out and declines, while foreign production increases, and the product is imported to the home market from foreign countries.
42. Under hegemony, protectionism is defensive and limits itself to protecting production in the home economy, abandoning the periphery to the hegemonic country. Under nonhegemony, by contrast, protectionism is more aggressive, including “political expansion at the periphery” (Bousquet 1980:77).
43. Bergesen (1982; 1985) relates the economic long wave to hegemonic succession. Bergesen (1982) speculates that long downswings bring mergers, but mostly in nonhegemonic countries, and that nonadaptation by hegemonic countries leads to hegemonic decline and succession. However, his dating of upswings and downswings (as with Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980) does not match that of other long wave scholars.
The world-system school as a whole, then, contains differences regarding the historical timing and characteristics of hegemony cycles, but Chase-Dunn, Bouquet, Wallerstein (after 1984), and Bergesen all argue that these cycles are longer than a pair of long waves. Chase-Dunn and Wallerstein agree on the rough timing of the cycle (starting with the Netherlands), and I consider this the main line of the school. The world-system school is fairly consensual in seeing hegemony as correlated with free trade, multilateral trade, and looser core-periphery relations; whereas lack of hegemony is correlated with protectionism, bilateral trade, and tighter core-periphery relations.

The parallel work of the world leadership school and the world-system school has led to various exchanges between them. This interschool debate is taken up in a volume edited by Thompson (1983) and in an exchange by Chase-Dunn and Sokolovsky (1981; 1983) with Thompson (1983a, b). The debate culminates in what Thompson calls the Cool Hand Luke Syndrome, which refers to a failure of communication. As with the long wave debate, communication across schools is difficult.

The Power Transition School

The third major school of the current war/hegemony debate, which I call the power transition school, is descended from Organski’s (1958) approach.

Charles Doran and Wes Parsons (1980; Doran 1983) remain essentially within Organski’s framework but add a cyclical component. They assume a regularity in the rise and fall of a nation’s relative capabilities in the international system, which they call a “power cycle.” Like Organski, they assume that a state’s relative power position affects the likelihood of war.

As shown in figure 6.3, Doran and Parsons (1980:949–53) fit regularized curves to data for each of nine great powers, indicating each country’s relative power (that is, share of total capability) for 1815–1975 (or however long the country was a “great power”). Countries seem to (more or less) follow logistic curves, gradually gaining

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44. These differences include vocabulary differences, such as the question of hyphenating world-system (Marxists do, others do not).
45. Rapkin (1984:28–29) attempts to “cobble together” arguments from the leadership cycle and world-system schools, along with hegemonic stability theory and structural Marxism. Rapkin generally endorse Modelski’s approach but tries to merge the two schools’ vocabularies, adopting the term hegemony/leadership.
46. Doran and Parsons measure the capability of countries not by GNP (as did Organski and Kugler) but by a combined measure on two dimensions: size (iron and steel production, population, and size of armed forces) and development (energy use, coal production, urbanization). War data come mainly from the Correlates of War project (Singer and Small).
47. Doran and Parsons (1980:947) study “the impact of long-term nonlinear changes in a state’s relative power on its propensity for extensive war.”
or losing their share of world power.\textsuperscript{48} Doran and Parsons conclude that "major powers pass through a cycle indexed by relative capability" (p. 952).

They hypothesize that "at critical points during this cycle where change is most rapid and disruptive of past trends, namely, at the inflection and turning points, the probability is highest of major power initiation of extensive war" (p. 953), because "it is at these points that the government is most vulnerable to overreaction, misperception, or aggravated use of force which may generate massive war" (p. 949).\textsuperscript{49}

Doran and Parsons analyze seventy-seven cases of war initiation by major powers. Using simple statistical groupings of wars by "critical periods" versus "remaining

\textsuperscript{48} The curve-fitting exercise has some of the familiar problems of fitting long cycles to short data sets.

\textsuperscript{49} These inflection and turning points, Doran and Parsons argue, "may engender feelings of powerlessness, determinism, and subsequent helplessness in a governing elite anxious about security" (p. 952).
they conclude that indeed "a major power is more prone to initiate a war that becomes extensive (i.e. escalates) during one of the critical periods on the cycle of relative power than at other times" (p. 960). Further, they find that the inflection points (where the rate of growth or decline shifts rather suddenly) rather than the turning points (where the level of relative capability is maximum or minimum) were most conducive to war. 50 I am somewhat skeptical of these results because of ad hoc elements in the methodology.

Robert Gilpin (1981) also follows the main thrust of the power transition school, though not in a cyclical framework. He argues that war is a resolution of systemic disequilibrium resulting from a differential growth of power among the actors in the international system. Gilpin integrates this theory with that of another neorealist, Waltz (1979), who makes an analogy between international politics and micro-economics. According to this approach, states act like firms and the international system like a market, so the "rational actor" model of economists can be applied to world politics. The nation-state, according to Gilpin, behaves "rationally" and seeks to change the international system only when the perceived benefits of doing so exceed the costs (p. 11). Hence the system is stable only when no actor thinks the benefits of change exceed the costs. The principle method of systemic change through history has been hegemonic war—war to reorder the international system (p. 15). 51 Gilpin's theory suggests a "power transition" explanation of the hegemony cycles—periodic hegemonic wars arising from (and correcting) systemic disequilibrium. But Gilpin's theory is not explicitly cyclical.

The distinctions between the three schools discussed in this chapter are captured by Modelski (1983:2), who distinguishes his approach from realist and neo-Marxist approaches as follows:

In contrast to realism, [it] strives not for universal generalizations about the behavior of states but only for propositions about time and space-bound systems. It represents politics not as something eternal or unchanging but subject to innovation and learning. . . . It also rejects the characterization of world politics as anarchical but is particularly sensitive to the role global wars have played in its organization.

On the other hand, in contrast to the world-systems approach, [it] eschews economic determinism and has a fuller conception of the role of the political process, and in particular global war, in the shaping of the modern world. It does, however, share with it a systemic and evolutionary perspective, a concern for space and time, and attention to global economic processes.

50. "Our findings show that most extensive wars involving major powers are not initiated at the top of their relative capability curves as is popularly supposed" (p. 963).

51. Just as the central ordering mechanism of the nation-state internally is property rights (here the argument draws on North and Thomas 1973) and the nation-state represents an efficient innovation relative to feudal states in this respect (see Organski and Kugler 1980:116), so the central ordering mechanism of the international system is territory, which plays a similar role internationally to the domestic role of property (Gilpin 1981:37).
Hybrid Theories

In addition to the three main schools of the current war/hegemony debate, several syntheses—hybrid theories—draw on more than one school.\(^{52}\)

*Raimo Väyrynen*

Väyrynen (1983a, b) synthesizes ideas from the world system, power transition, and leadership cycle schools.\(^{53}\) Väyrynen (1983b:392) argues that “the role of power transitions and political management in the outbreak of warfare between major powers is affected by the socio-political context associated with various phases of the long economic cycle [long wave].” He thus (pp. 393–402) links long waves with hegemony, using the following datings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hegemonic phase</th>
<th>Accelerated growth (Up)</th>
<th>Decelerated growth (Down)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic victory</td>
<td>1845–1872</td>
<td>1825–1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic maturity</td>
<td>1872–1892</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining hegemony</td>
<td>1892–1913/29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascending hegemony</td>
<td>1929–1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic victory</td>
<td>1948–1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic maturity</td>
<td></td>
<td>1973–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Väyrynen’s long wave phases match the base dating scheme, and the phases of hegemony match the dates of Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979:499),\(^{54}\) at least roughly.\(^{55}\) Väyrynen’s analysis extends back only to 1825, however.

Väyrynen then considers the “war-proneness” of the international system. He argues (1983b:409) that the periods of hegemonic decline (1872–92 and 1973–) have been marked by little major-power war, while phases of ascending hegemony (1892–1929) were marked by much major-power war.\(^{56}\) The two other phases, hegemonic victory and maturity (a long wave downswing and upswing, respectively) had a mix of “some” or “little” major-power war.

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52. In addition to the hybrid theories, there are occasional works that do not engage the current debate and are not referred to by others in the field. An example is Zambell (1984), who links Kondratieff waves, war, and a 150-year “world supremacy cycle.” His dating of the latter is unusual: the world leaders are listed as Spain (1580s–1730s), France (1680s–1830s), England (1780s–1930s), and the U.S. (1880s–2030s). The 150 years of each leader contains three long waves, the first of which coincides with the last long wave of the previous leader’s reign. Zambell’s scheme seems rigidly mechanistic and does not engage the existing debate.

53. From his relatively neutral base in Finland, Väyrynen is aware of the distinctions between these schools and open-minded toward possibilities for synthesis among them.

54. But not of the later Wallerstein or of Chase-Dunn.

55. There is a one-to-one correspondence, but dates of turning points differ somewhat.

56. This accounts for the increased amount of war on the long wave upswing, which Kondratieff had noted.
Väyrynen (1983b:411) tabulates war data by phase period as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Wars</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Magnitude&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Severity&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascending hegemony</td>
<td>Russia-Japan</td>
<td>1904–1905</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>1914–1919</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian civil</td>
<td>1917–1921</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic victory</td>
<td>USSR-Japan</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>1939–1945</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic maturity</td>
<td>Crimean</td>
<td>1853–1856</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austro-Prussian</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Franco-Prussian</td>
<td>1870–1871</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1951–1953</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining hegemony</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Number of nation-months of war  
<sup>b</sup>Number of battle deaths in 1,000s

He notes that, in line with Kondratieff’s theory, seven of the nine wars among major powers since 1825 took place on long wave upswings and the other two in the recovery stage at the end of the downswing. Most interestingly, “no wars among major powers have been waged during periods of hegemonic decline” (p. 414).<sup>57</sup>

Väyrynen’s work thus draws upon several traditions in the war/hegemony and long wave debates and dates hegemony cycles as paired long waves. His empirical study provides some clues to the connections of the long wave with hegemony but is weakened by the short period of time he studies (since 1825).

**Jack Levy**

Levy draws upon both the Singer tradition of behavioral research (see chapter 5)<sup>58</sup> and the “realist” tradition. He develops (1983a) a data set similar to the basic components of the cow data but covering all wars that involve “great powers” from 1495 to 1975 rather than from 1815 to 1975.<sup>59</sup> Levy then analyzes those data statistically to test various hypotheses about great power war.<sup>60</sup>

Levy (1984) focuses on the idea, derived from Organski, of a “preventive war by the dominant power to weaken or destroy a rising challenger while that opportunity is

57. Elsewhere, Väyrynen (1983a) pursues the cost-of-wars argument (see Wright and Farrar discussions, chap. 5), connecting war with long economic upswings. He argues that during the upswing phase the cost of a growing military is easier to carry than during the downswing.

58. Levy (1981:609) calls his work “part of an ongoing tradition of research, initiated by Singer and Small.”

59. Levy (1983b) contrasts his “Great Power framework” with “world system” approaches.

60. For example, Levy (1981:610) finds that evidence from five centuries contradicts the hypothesis that alliance formation correlates with or precedes high levels of war. Levy and Morgan (1984) show empirical support for the hypothesis that the frequency of war in a given period is inversely related to its seriousness.
Table 6.1. Comparison of Definitions of General War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Levy</th>
<th>Modelski</th>
<th>Thompson</th>
<th>Wallerstein</th>
<th>Gilpin</th>
<th>Doran</th>
<th>Mowat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italian wars</td>
<td>1494-1525</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wars of Charles V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>War of Dutch Independence/Spanish Armada</td>
<td>1585-1609</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thirty Years' War</td>
<td>1618-1648</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dutch War of Louis XIV</td>
<td>1672-1678</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>War of the League of Augsburg</td>
<td>1688-1697</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>War of the Spanish Succession</td>
<td>1701-1713</td>
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<tr>
<td>War of Jenkin's Ear/Austrian Succession</td>
<td>1739-1748</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Seven Years' War</td>
<td>1755-1763</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Revolutionary &amp; Napoleonic wars</td>
<td>1792-1815</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>1914-1918</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>1939-1945</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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Levy's notes:

a. It is not clear which wars Doran (1983a: 179) includes in the "Hapsburg attempt to dominate Europe" or which of Louis XIV's wars he includes.

b. Regarding ending dates: Toynbee uses 1525, while Modelski and Thompson use 1517.

Mowat includes the wars of Charles V by identifying 1539 as the end of the war.

c. Toynbee opens the war in 1568, Modelski in 1576; Thompson and I [Levy] wait until the internationalization of the civil war in 1585.

d. 'Toynbee classifies World War II as a "supplemental war" but in a footnote refers to it as a "recurring general war" (p. 225). Modelski, Thompson, Wallerstein, and Gilpin all treat the two world wars of this century as a single global war.


still available." He reviews the theories and definitions relating to preventive war, drawing on and distinguishing the approaches of Morgenthau, Organski, Doran, Gilpin, Modelski, and Thompson.

Levy and Morgan (1985) study "war-weariness"—the hypothesis that a war between the great powers affects the likelihood of another war in a subsequent period. Such a hypothesis could help to explain the cyclical character of major wars. But, in agreement with previous behavioral studies of this question, Levy and Morgan find no evidence for the war-weariness hypothesis (p. 17).

Levy (1985) reviews different approaches to the question of "general war," drawing on major works from all three schools in the war/hegemony debate. He shows that different assumptions on the part of different scholars lead to differing definitions of general war and hence to varied lists of wars included in this category. Levy puts forward his own three criteria for general war and a resulting list of ten wars (see table 6.1). Levy himself (1985) adopts a "realist" approach to general war, and particularly to the role of coalitions in those wars—in explicit contrast to the approaches of Modelski and Wallerstein. He argues that "a traditional realpolitik

61. He reviews Toynbee, Modelski, Thompson, Organski, Doran, Gilpin, Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn, and Väyrynen. See also Midlarsky (1984b).

62. Levy finds that coalition formation in general wars fits the idea—central to balance-of-power theory—that a threat by any single power to gain a dominant position will generate an opposing coalition to restore equilibrium.
perspective provides a better explanation . . . than do other perspectives based on economic or global assumptions." 63

However, Levy’s rejection of Modelski’s approach seems to stem partly from incommensurable vocabularies. In Levy’s terminology, the “leading power” is the power that threatens to gain a dominant position—such as France or Germany—while in Modelski’s framework the “world leader” is the leader of the peripheral coalition that contains these challengers.

This misunderstanding reflects a different area of attention in Levy’s work from that of Modelski. For Levy, the key arena is continental Europe, where the wars between the great powers are fought. For Modelski, it is the oceanic arena, where naval powers struggle for dominance of extra-European avenues. 64

63. The “economic” assumptions clearly are those of the world system school, and “global” assumptions are those of the leadership cycle school.

64. While Levy argues that the great powers have always feared their Continental neighbors more than the more distant oceanic powers, Modelski argues that the oceanic powers order the international system through their “world-reach” capabilities.